In this paper we present the implementation of a WebRTC gateway service that can forward ad-hoc RTP data plane traffic from a browser on one local network to a browser on another local network. The advantage compared to the existing IETF STUN (RFC 5389), TURN (RFC 5766) and ICE (RFC 5245) protocols is that it does not require a public host and port mapping for each participating local host, and it works with more restrictive firewall policies. WebRTC implements ICE which combines STUN and TURN probes to automatically find the best connection between two peers who want to communicate. In corporate networks, simple hole punching and NAT traversal techniques typically do not work, e.g. because of symmetric NATs. Dynamic allocation of ports on an external 3rd party relay service is also typically blocked on restricted hosts. In our use case, doctors at hospitals can only access port 80 through the hospital firewall on external machines, and they need to communicate with patients who are typically behind a NAT in a local WiFi network. VPN solutions only work for staff but not between patients and staff. Our solution solves this problem by redirecting all WebRTC traffic through a gateway service on the local network that has a secure tunnel established with a public gateway. The public gateway redirects traffic from multiple concurrent streams securely between local gateway services that connect to it. The local gateways also communicate with browsers on their local network to mimic a direct browser-to-browser connection without having to change the browser runtime. We have demonstrated that this technique works well within the hospital network and arbitrary patient networks, without the need for any individual host configuration. In our evaluation we show that the latency overhead is 18-20 ms for each concurrent stream added to the same gateway service, which is not discernible with a naked eye until you have more than 10 concurrent streams.
INTRODUCTION
Audio and video conferencing services have long been the ultimate communication tool between remote participants connected to the Internet. Innovation has, however, been curbed by a plethora of incompatible, proprietary protocols and tools controlled by a few companies. Custom solutions have been very costly and complex to implement. At the same time the Web has evolved from being a simple on-line newspaper to become a full-fledged operating system.
With WebRTC [4] this operating system is now also capable of running standards-based audio and video conferencing applications. The same flood of innovation that we have grown used to with the Social Web is now finally also available to audio and video streaming applications. However, the uptake of the technology is restricted by the assumption of a direct peer-to-peer connection between participating parties. In particular in corporate networks this is a big issue, and has been an issue for traditional applications such as Skype too. The difference here is that at least the control plane of the streaming applications can get through the firewall as standard port 80 Web traffic. The remaining problem is how to route the data plane, i.e. the RTP and RTCP (IETF RFC 4571 [12] and 3711 [3] ) packets. WebRTC mandates that these packets should go through a single port which helps to some extent, but there is still an issue of traversing NATs and Firewalls. The WebRTC solution to this problem is ICE RFC 5245 [15] (Interactive Connectivity Establishment). It is a bundle of a number of techniques including STUN [16] (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) and TURN [14] (Traversal Using Relay NAT) to find IP address and port pairs that can communicate directly. STUN techniques are typically blocked because internal hosts are simply not reachable on routable IP addresses. TURN on the other hand assumes that you can dynamically allocate ports freely on external networks that can relay the traffic. This means that you would need to add a firewall exception for each stream, which is complicated by the fact that these ports are dynamically allocated and can be shared among many users over time. For many corporate and hospital networks there is a very limited range of outbound ports that may be allocated, in the most restrictive case only port 80 is allowed.
Our solution to this problem is to leverage a two-hop, secure tunnel pipeline between two arbitrary networks that channels all RTP and RTCP traffic between these networks, while only requiring port allocations on each local network.
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To accomplish this we implement a gateway service that supports the ICE and STUN protocols to mimic a Web browser peer. No modifications were necessary to the browser source code 1 . We only need to intercept WebRTC signalling messages during connection establishment. These signalling messages must be intercepted in any case, since WebRTC does not define a standard channel for relaying these messages, although a web socket service is commonly used. We need to extract the credentials for the session from SDP [10] (Session Description Protocol) offers and answers as well as the ICE candidate IP address and port that the peers want to receive traffic on. Then we allocate sessions on-demand and open up UDP ports on local gateways with lease-based tunnels through a central gateway. These local gateways do not need any configuration except for pointing to the right central gateway, and only one local gateway needs to run for each local network where you want to run WebRTC browser clients. Similarly, the browser client needs to point to the GUID of the local gateway. Except for those configurations, the session setup and tear-down is fully automatic.
We evaluated the approach by deploying it in a real hospital network to tunnel traffic to different clients behind NATs. The measured overhead in our experiment is less than 20ms.
This work was done as part of a project to provide IT-based support for home-care treatment of cancer patients [11] in Southern Sweden.
Our contributions in this paper include:
• the design and implementation of a gateway service capable of tunneling SRTP media traffic compatible with ICE and WebRTC; and
• a set of experiments to measure the latency, session setup overhead, and multi-stream scalability of our solution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present related work. Section 3 discusses the requirements on our work from the home-care project. In Section 4 we give an overview of WebRTC and in Section 5 we provide some background information on a pervasive computing middleware toolkit, called Palcom, that is leveraged in our work. Then in Section 6 we present the design of our gateway. Our solution is evaluated in Section 7, and then we conclude in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
In [21] the general problem of sending WebRTC UDP traffic across corporate firewalls is discussed and why current TURN and STUN solutions do no help. Their tunneling solution does not solve the port allocation problem, and does not allow load balancing traffic across gateways on the local network. All traffic also goes through their central server, whereas our solution allows distributed central gateways as well.
1 the WebRTC runtime used in the Google Chrome browser that we tested with is open source, and thus any component embedding this runtime should work well with our solution Loreto et al. [13] discuss how multiple media streams can be sent through the same port for the same session with WebRTC today to avoid "opening a new hole for each stream used". However, this solution does not allow you to send multiple streams from different sessions through the same port.
Rodriguez et al. [1] proposed a Multipoint Control Unit (MCU) architecture for WebRTC to provide additional services such as multi-party conferences, gatewaying between protocols and call recording. They, however, do not address the specific challenges of firewall traversal in restricted networks.
The SIP community has been heavily involved in the development of WebRTC and thus the current standard allows for seamless tunneling between SIP gateways and WebRTC browsers as described in [2] . Architecturally, the SIP gateway solution is similar, but servers such as Meetecho RTCWebLite [2] focus more on protocol and signalling plane conversions rather than the firewall traversal problem that we address.
Predating WebRTC, a large number of firewall traversal solutions have been evaluated for relaying SIP-based audio and video sessions through Enterprise networks in [18, 6, 7] . The techniques studied include STUN, UPnP, MIDCOM, Sen, FANTOM, STEM, PSTN Gateway, SIP Proxy, Application Level Gateway, DMZ MCU, and Semi-Tunnels/Transparent Traversal. The last technique in the list 2 [7] , is similar architecturally to our approach in that a local network client relays multiple sessions through a public network server. The motivation in that case was to avoid having to change legacy firewall deployments, while we also have this goal our main motivation for this architecture is to avoid having to change the browser source code.
Our solution differs from all of these pre-WebRTC solutions as they do not leverage a signalling plane (in our case WebRTC JSEP) that trivially traverses firewalls via port 80/443. Furthermore our solution only requires a standard browser to be run on a participating client machine.
HOME CARE REQUIREMENTS
The work in this paper is motivated by the requirements from a project in applied research involving the University hospital in Lund, Lund University and 6 companies [11] . The aim is to develop IT-support for the situation where patients are enrolled at the hospital, but given advanced care at home. This is a form of care that is growing rapidly, in particular for chronically ill patients, and seen as a benefit both for patients and the hospital, as long as the patients feel safe in this situation. It does, however, demand new kinds of support systems. Medical equipment at home needs to be remotely monitored (and controlled) from the hospital in order to avoid frequent technically-motivated visits to the home. The mobile staff needs new facilities for handling the information flow in order to avoid doing the same task twice (notes on paper later entered into a computer system), having updated information at hand, and work efficiently in general. Communication over a variety of media, including video, between patient and staff is believed to be crucial for many patients to feel safe in this situation. Existing video communication systems, such as Skype and Lync, are not applicable in this situation due to security concerns,such as
• access to the patient on video needs to be restricted,
• management overhead,
• separate registration of patients addresses,
• and lack of integration possibilities.
We aim at a single integrated support system for home care. With these concerns, the possibilities offered by WebRTC (see Section 4) are very attractive. The technique demanded from a security point of view in a healthcare system for remote access by the medical personnel (VPN-tunnels with 2-factor authentication using hard certificates on identity cards) is not practical to use for connecting patients and home-based equipment. The architecture chosen is instead based on having servers outside the hospital firewall, and connect out from inside the hospital, and thus being in full control of if and when to connect and what information to make available outside the firewall. This is an architecture that is also preferred from a security point of view by the hospital over potentially 1000s of constantly open VPN tunnels. The very restricted policy of which ports and protocols to open in the firewall, lead to the conclusion that we need to communicate using TCP/IP over port 80. With the communication software we are using, all logical connections (supporting the need as outlined above) are multiplexed over one such link. When adding support for video in this set-up, we thus also want to multiplex the video over this link. Network-wise, we assume that this link is realized on a high-speed network -perhaps the computers involved are even physically in the same computer room. The bandwidth should thus not be a problem here even if there are several video-connections active at the same time.
The equipment in the other end, in the patient's home, or in the field carried by mobile nurses, are using a similar multiplexing setup, but must rely on much weaker infrastructure, such as 3/4G mobile technology or slow up-links from the patient's home.
WEBRTC
WebRTC is a new standard being developed by W3C [4] (browser API) and IETF 3 (wire protocol) to allow audio and video conferencing capabilities without plugins in Web browsers. This means that audio and video-streaming applications can be developed directly in Javascript and deployed and run through a standard Web browser. This approach is is very attractive for our scenario described in Section 3, because most devices today run a Web browser. Furthermore, in certain restricted environments, such as a hospital, a Web browser is the only end-user application that is allowed to run.
The WebRTC API comprises two main parts. First, the HTML5 GetUserMedia (GUM) API [5] , is used to give the Web page access to media from local audio and video capturing devices. For video, the picture frames may, for instance, be mapped to an HTML5 Canvas or Video element for direct pixel-by-pixel access and display respectively. Second, the PeerConnection API allows these video and audio streams to be attached to a peer-to-peer audio and videoconferencing session. The connection is established through an Offer and Answer protocol, based on SDP negotiation, that is transmitted over a signalling channel. This protocol is defined in an IETF draft called Javascript Session Establishment Protocol (JSEP) [20] . It allows the Javascript application to intercept and enhance the session parameters being negotiated. This protocol is what allows our solution to redirect the traffic through our gateway without having to modify the browser. The fact that these APIs are being standardized also means that the code we use to intercept and modify the session establishment is generally applicable across browsers in theory 4 . One key part in the use of JSEP for our scenario is that the signalling plane communication is not specified, which means that the browser just gives the application callbacks with payloads, e.g. SDP, to send to the other peer. Conversely, when a WebRTC payload is received at the other end it is fed into the WebRTC runtime by calling APIs on the PeerConnection API after potentially having read and modified it. The only requirement on this application-level channel is that it needs to be real-time, and there needs to be a way for peers to rendezvous. Hence, many applications use COMET [8] or WebSockets [9] for this purpose.
However, for the data plane, the suite of WebRTC APIs assume that the application does not intercept or modify the communication. The UDP packets are sent on internal sockets directly between the browser WebRTC runtimes. This is the main issue we need to solve as the current PeerConnection API assumes that there is a direct connection between the peers (that can be established through ICE [15] ) . As previously discussed, in most corporate networks including hospital networks, it is not possible to establish such direct connections to peers outside the local network.
The way to solve this particular issue of also redirecting the data traffic is to intercept and rewrite the ICE endpoint candidates sent using the JSEP protocol. We will discuss in more detail how we accomplish this in Section 6.
An alternative solution could have been to plug in our tunnel behind a custom server supporting the TURN protocol and use the standard JSEP exchange without modifications. However, we opted not to pursue this approach at this point since it would involve implementing the full TURN stack and protocol, when we already have most of this functionality in our existing middleware, Palcom, which we describe next.
PALCOM
The Palcom architecture [19] includes Palcom devices (or applications) which can communicate on a local network and tunnels that connect Palcom devices over remote networks and multiplex their communication over a single TCP/IP port. Since every Palcom device can act as a router of Palcom discovery and application traffic, one such Tunnel is enough for all Palcom devices on one side of the Tunnel to connect to any of the Palcom devices on the other side of the Tunnel (and vice versa). If Palcom Tunnels are established from Palcom devices on local networks behind NAT or Firewalls to the same Palcom device on a visible network it appears to the Palcom devices as if they are on the same local network when it comes to discovery and communication.
The Palcom tools include an application that serves as a service container, and is exposed as an empty device, called "theThing". This application can dynamically load and execute functionality in terms of Palcom Services. The functionality we used in our WebRTC gateway is implemented as such Palcom Services and deployed to instances of theThing executing in local networks and a central location. The Tunnels are provided by the instances of theThing and can swiftly be configured to use whatever ports that might be open. This architecture thus clearly separates the functionality that talks the WebRTC protocols (embedded in the Palcom Services) from the functionality that provides the NAT and Firewall traversal techniques. Tunnels used in this work are built on TCP/IP in order to get through tight firewalls, where one can expect that the only option is to use port 80. UDP is in general much more efficient and would be attractive to use in less restricted situations. In this work all measurements has, however, been done using TCP/IP based tunnels. An interesting alternative would be to use TCP for the Hospital-Server link (typical over a high-speed wired network) and using an UDP based tunnel for the Patient-Server link (typical over wireless slow up-link networks). The Palcom architecture would handle such a situation without change since the general communication and routing mechanisms are independent of the network technology used. This is made possible because Palcom includes a message transport protocol that can encapsulate data of any application protocol (such as RTP and RTCP in this work).
Palcom services are also readily accessible from a Web browser thanks to a recently developed Web bridge [17] , which makes them a good fit for our WebRTC gateway implementation.
Next, we describe how we implement our WebRTC gateway using Palcom, and the WebRTC APIs and protocols.
WEBRTC GATEWAY
Our solution comprises three services, a tunnel (TUN), a local RTC (Real-Time Communication) gateway (LGAT) and a central RTC gateway (CGAT). All control plane traffic between the components go through a Web Server using a publish and subscribe model implemented with long-polling and exposed with a REST interface that can be accessed through an API similar to HTML5 WebSockets 5 .
The
LGAT services are typically deployed within local networks behind firewalls and the CGAT service is deployed on the public Internet. The TUN service, described in more detail in the previous section, is responsible for multiplexing the traffic that comes into it through a single well-known port to another tunnel peer which would sit on a different network such as the public Internet. One could imagine tunneling directly between the peer networks but that makes the configurations more volatile and it may also be a security issue to give access directly into services running in a remote local network (such as a hospital or corporate network).
To simplify deployment we by default deploy a default CGAT service so that only local gateway configurations need to be set to establish a session. If the CGAT service detects that both peers use the same LGAT no gateway redirection will be performed and the standard WebRTC protocol will be used. However, if the peers have two different
LGATs we set up and communicate through TUN in four initiation phases: offer and answer exchange, candidate exchange, STUN endpoint verification and finally SRTP (Secure RealTime Protocol) and SRTCP (Secure Real-Time Control Protocol) data traffic exchange. All of these phases are present in the standard WebRTC browser-to-browser communication as well. Next we describe in more detail how we extend each phase to create an efficient and secure WebRTC tunnel.
Phase I: Offer and Answer Exchange
WebRTC does not specify how peers rendezvous, or how control messages between them are relayed. As previously mentioned, we take the some approach as most existing applications of sending the messages through a WebSocket-like pubsub service. In this first phase we do not make any modifications to the standard exchange protocol except to piggy back gateway data in the messages. This phase comprises the following steps (see Figure 2 ):
1. The WebRTC runtime in browser A generates an SDP (Session Description Protocol) offer through JSEP containing among other things user and password credentials for the session.
2. We intercept the offer in a local Javascript library (yellow box) before it is broadcast to potential peers. The signalling plane of WebRTC is not defined in the specification but could treat the JSEP protocol as a black box, i.e. no knowledge of payload is necessary, you just need to pass the data from the WebRTC runtime in browser A to browser B by some means. This makes it easy for us to attach additional information to the signalling payload without the knowledge of the respective WebRTC runtimes while still being fully compliant to the JSEP handshake protocol. The information we add is simply the identity of the LGAT of browser A (LGATA).
3. The enhanced offer is now passed through the CGAT service (which keeps track of who is online in which virtual Web conference room) and broadcast to everyone listening on the pubsub channel where browser A sent the offer.
4. Browser B receives the offer payload and we intercept the SDP data before it reaches the WebRTC runtime.
5. We extract the credentials (ice-ufrag and ice-pwd) from the offer SDP. These credentials are cached locally in the Javascript runtime for later use.
6. Browser B will now generate an answer SDP to browser A's offer. We intercepts this answer too before sending it off to browser B, and extract the answer credentials. Now by combining these credentials with the credentials extracted from the offer we have all the information needed for our gateway to verify incoming connection requests and to sign outgoing connection requests properly. In particular the following two pairs of user name and passwords are constructed: {u1 : u2, p1} and {u2 : u1, p2}, where ux is the ice-ufrag attribute of user x and px is the ice-pwd attribute of user x. As the answer reaches browser B the credentials will be extracted similarly there.
7. The Answer from B is sent back through the Web server.
8. It follows the reverse route through the CGAT back to browser A.
9. The Answer is received by browser A and intercepted again by our Javascript library.
10. The credentials are extracted from the Answer SDP and cached locally in browser A.
This completes the first phase of our tunnel setup.
Phase II: Candidate Exchange
The following phase of candidate IP address and protocol (TCP or UDP) exchange may start before the offer and answer exchange has completed fully, so we need to account for certain events in this phase sometimes happening before and sometimes after events in the previous phase. Our general solution to that problem is to cache away results needed for an action and when we detect that we have complete information from both peers we fire our event to proceed to the next step. Most of the heavy lifting of our gateway setup is done in this phase which proceeds in the following steps (see Figure 3 ):
1. The WebRTC runtime in browser A generates a candidate IP address, port and protocol. If browser A is on a local network it could send us a non-routable IP, such as 192.168.0.10. This is no problem for our gateway though since we assume that LGAT is on the same local network as the browser, which is sufficient to route traffic. We pass the (ice-)candidate without any modifications to the Web server through the session that was established in the previous phase.
2. Browser B receives the candidate sent by browser A. Now we intercept the message before passing it on to the local WebRTC runtime.
3. In the previous phase, browser B received the LGAT of browser A. This LGAT reference together with the IP, port and protocol information that was just received are now sent to the Web server in an allocate request targeted at the local LGAT service in container B. Note that the browser can only communicate with HTTP to the same domain as the Web page (unless we use a JSONP hack) and can thus not send this message directly to the local LGAT. Exposing this local container through a JSONP cross domain HTTP API could be a security vulnerability though, which is why we can only communicate with the LGAT through the CGAT. From a developer perspective it is also much less complicated since we can just send the messages through the same pubsub API as all other WebRTC control messages.
The Allocate request goes through the CGAT, as the web server may not be o the same network as the
LGAT services, which is the whole point of having our tunnel.
5. The Allocate request is received by the local gateway. An internal session is now established and we store the remote LGAT in Container A, as well as the port,IP and protocol (for now we only support UDP, but it would be trivial to handle TCP as well) that was in the candidate message generated by browser A. We also allocate a new port on the local network and send the port and IP as well as the session id back.
6. The allocate reply passes through the CGAT which takes note of the session id in order to block unknown sessions to be forwarded to the LGAT later on.
7.
The allocate reply then reaches Browser B again, and the allocated IP and port are extracted.
At this point when we know that a session has been allocated in our local
LGAT service, we can also store the credentials we cached in the previous phase in the LGAT service. Note that this request goes through the CGAT as well for the same reasons as mentioned above. Also note that the reason why this is a separate request as opposed to being data just piggy-backed on the allocate request is that the first and the second phase overlap. This means that the credentials may not be available at the time the allocate request is called. Of course we could still piggy-back it if it is available, but we, in either case, need to have a separate operation to set the credentials out-of-band.
9. Now the original candidate request received in step 2 is modified to contain the just allocated IP and port instead of the IP and port allocated by browser A.
Once that is done the modified candidate is sent to the WebRTC runtime as if it was received directly from browser A.
This is the first step in redirecting the WebRTC traffic to our tunnel. However, it only results in the browser sending out STUN verification requests to the IP and port we redirected it too. In order to receive valid data traffic on that host and port we need also respond to the STUN requests correctly, which is the task of the next phase.
The parameter passing and operation sequence of the first two phases are summarized in a UML sequence diagram in Figure 4 . 
Phase III: STUN Endpoint Verification
The final step before being able to send data traffic on our tunnel is to verify our allocated IP and port with the Browser WebRTC runtimes. This phase can overlap with the previous two phases because the two peers run the phases concurrently to each other. However, we are guaranteed that it does not happen until we set the allocated IP and port in the candidate rewrite step (step 9) in the previous phase for the local browser. This means that we may not be ready to fully answer the initial STUN requests as the browser start generating them. There is a very sensitive balance between allocating the candidate too late and too early. The browser gives up after sending too many unanswered STUN requests. However, it may also give up if we do not provide any candidates soon enough. Another issue is that the browser bombards the LGAT with STUN requests, so trying to answer them all before the setup is complete can slow down the gateway to the point that the final setup calls can not be served. For this reason we can configure the LGAT service to ignore a certain number of STUN requests before attempting to answer them correctly. There is a default value that works in most cases but for very CPU deprived machines it may need to be modified.
The verification proceeds concurrently in both browsers in the following steps (see Figure 5 ):
1. The browser sends a STUN BindingRequest to the allocated IP and port using UDP. At this point we need to determine if it is a STUN request very efficiently since the actual data will pass through the same IP and port using the same transport protocol (UDP).
2. Once we have determined that it is a valid STUN BindingRequest and we have the correct user credentials to answer the request (and the number of STUN packets configured to drop have been dropped) we create a STUN BindingResponse. The response contains the integrity attribute, which means that it is signed with the user credentials of the remote browser. Note that the STUN requests are never passed through the tunnel, we have all the information needed to answer them in the local LGAT, which is an optimization, as it saves network traffic.
3. However, this also means that the local browser will never receive any STUN Binding Requests, which is also a requirement for the data traffic to commence. Hence, we also compose a STUN BindingRequest at the same time as the BindingResponse is composed. Both the BindingResponse and the new BindingRequest are then sent on the same browser IP and port that the original BindingRequest came from.
In earlier versions of Chrome this was a Google specific ICE protocol without message integrity checks and message signatures. Hence, earlier versions of our services implemented this proprietary protocol. Now since Chrome 24 both Chrome and our LGAT services will send STUN messages according to the standard ICE RFC 5245 protocol including message integrity signatures. We are now ready to route media streams, which is described in the next phase. 
Phase IV: Data Traffic Routing
The routing of WebRTC media streams proceeds as follows (see Figure 6 ):
1. Browser A sends the SRTP or SRTCP packets over UDP to the IP and port we allocated for this session in the previous phases.
The
LGAT service then looks at the browser B LGAT service associated with this session as well as the IP and port of the browser B. This info is sent to the CGAT service with the data packet. The reason that it is not routed directly to the remote LGAT is that they sit on different networks and we may not want to give full connectivity of services across sessions to, for instance, protect patient data in a hospital doctor and patient exchange which was the use case that motivate us to build this tunnel. The WebRTC RTP payloads are all encrypted so one only needs to make sure that the SDP singalling plane is encrypted where the credentials are included to secure the protocol. This means that if someone else receives a data packet, e.g. by sniffing our tunnel or RTC gateway traffic they cannot do anything with it. We also have the option of encrypting our tunnel traffic, but in this case it is overkill. To encrypt the signalling traffic we simply rely on HTTPS which is supported by our Web socket implementation trivially since it only relies on the browser XHR (XMLHttpRequest aka AJAX) API [17] .
3. The central container does a quick session verification to make sure that the browser B LGAT in fact expects the packet before forwarding it.
4. When the data packet arrives at the remote LGAT it can be directly forwarded without any further checks.
Optionally we can do a checksum since all that information is available, but since the WebRTC traffic is so sensitive to latency we avoid intercepting and processing the actual data packets more than necessary. The WebRTC browser runtimes drive the full SRTP and SRTCP protocol, so there is no need to reinvent that security either.
5. Finally, the data packets arrive at browser B, and will show up in the browser UI. 
STUN Server
As a final note we now describe our ICE STUN server inside the LGAT service in some more detail. As previously mentioned this service is responsible for both responding properly to STUN messages received by the browser runtime on the local network as well as to generate STUN messages to simulate the remote browser sending STUN messages to the local network browser. Our ICE STUN implementation uses the ICE4J library to compose and parse STUN messages. We also add an efficient way of checking whether the message is a STUN binding request or a RTP/RTCP packet by peaking into the assumed STUN header, so we do not try to parse every incoming packet, as all the packets will be sent on the same UDP IP address and port. Now if we determine that the incoming packet is a STUN requests we parse the Transaction ID and extract the IP and port of the sender of the packet (the browser WebRTC runtime). The IP address and port are now used to create a XOR mapped address attribute in a binding success response. We also add the integrity and finger print attributes according to RFC 5245. In order to properly create these attributes we need to find a key to sign the message with. This key is obtained from the password mapped to the ufrag derived username attribute matching the STUN username attribute of the incoming stun binding request. Now half of the work is done. In addition to replying to the SUN binding request we also need to generate our own binding request to the local browser to mimic the remote browser sending this request. This is done as follows. The username of the incoming request is flipped so the part before ":" is appears after and vice versa. Now the password of this flipped user name is looked up to sign the integrity part of the request. Priority, Controlling and TieBreaker attributes are populated either with default values or if they appear in the incoming request they are simply copied over. We also add an empty UseCandidate attribute because Chrome tends to do that. Next, both the request and response are sent to the appropriate UDP host and port of the local browser and we are done. We note that the integrity checks are done with short term credentials according to RFC5389 and RFC5245. It is trivial to support long-term credentials in our gateway too as it would just involve setting up the username and password pairs from another source than the SDP answers and offers. So only the Javascript application code would need to be modified slightly.
EVALUATION
To evaluate our gateway we run experiments to measure the latency impact for ongoing sessions,the overhead incurred when initiating a session, and the scalability in terms of concurrent streams.
Latency Evaluation
We leverage the WebRTC getStats statistics API on the PeerConnection directly from Javascript in one of the participating browsers 6 to extract stream performance values. Sampling was done on a second-by-second basis, and averages were calculated each minute. We base our final metrics on statistics from 7-minute long test sessions, where the first two minutes are ignored as a warmup phase. Although we extracted many more metrics, two key metrics that we base our comparisons on are round-trip-time (RTT) 7 and Jitter 8 . We also looked at loss and frame rates, but could not see any interesting differences between direct connections and tunneled connections in those metrics.
Since our gateway can be deployed both as a personal gateway on the same host as the browser and as a shared gateway in an internal network, we evaluate the impact of local (personal) and remote gateways. In the remote gateway experiment we let the remote gateway run on the same host as the remote peer. Hence we only add network traffic in this setup while keeping the processing power the same.
To further study the impact under different network settings we run experiments using both wireless (WiFi) and a wired (Ethernet) access to the same network.
During our experimentation we also found that the performance of the peer machines make a big difference in terms 6 Google Chrome Version 30 7 googRtt in stats type ssrc 8 googJitterReceived in stats type ssrc of the latency results. We therefore also compare our results with experiments done where one laptop was replaced with a slower laptop. Both The faster and the slower laptop run Windows 7 and have a 1.6-1.7GHz CPU. The Windows Experience Index for the slower laptop is 3.2 9 and for the faster laptop 5.6
10 .
The RTT and jitter results for the fast laptop running on the wired network with local and remote gateways is shown in Figure 7 . The direct value denotes the performance of a stream that follows the default browser behavior and communicates directly between browsers.
The RTT and jitter results for the fast laptop running on the wireless network with local and remote gateways is shown in Figure 8 .
The RTT and jitter results for the slow laptop 11 running on the wired network with local and remote gateways is shown in Figure 9 . As expected, the round trip times suffer quite a bit, but given that the alternative in many cases is no stream at all, the slight lag may be acceptable. The frame rates are very stable and there is virtually no loss and only a modest increase in jitter.
For the slow laptop the local gateway does not perform so well since the machine gets overloaded. Note that the remote gateway runs on the other peer's machine so the overall experiment load is the same. For the fast laptop running a local gateway is better, though, since it avoids extra cross host traffic.
Session Initiation Overhead
We now study the impact on the video and audio session initiation time. The overhead incurred is due to the extra redirections and remote allocations executed as described for the four phases (I, II, III, IV) in Section 6. We measure both the time from the user clicking on a button to initiate the call to the time when the Offer/Answer Exchange is done (roughly the completion of Phase I), and to the time when the first media packet was both sent and received. The latter part is where the bulk of the overhead is and from a user experience perspective it shows up as the video element on the web page being black before it starts showing a stream. The first initiation time is easy to measure from callbacks but the second one is a bit trickier since we do not have full access to the UDP packets inside the browser. Thus, we again rely on the PeerConnection getStats API to determine when data packets have both been sent and received 12 . The results for the local and remote gateway settings using the fast laptop and wired network setup can be seen in Figure 10 .
We can see that stream setup time is not effected by our gateway, but media setup incurs 2-5 seconds of overhead compared to a direct connection for local and remote gateways respectively.
Scalability
12 packetsSent and packetsReceived in the ssrc stats type We have designed the gateway to be shared among clients on the same local network. Two requirements result from that. First, the gateway should be easy to reuse between clients, and second it should handle concurrent streams without too much overhead. Since the second requirement relies on the first we only focus on showing the evaluating the second here. Based on our design the first requirement is also trivially met, as we create separate leased tunnels (essentially ports) for each session.
To evaluate the overhead of running multiple concurrent streams in the same LGAT and CGAT services we set up an experiment involving four machines, the desktop, and the fast and slow laptop from the previous experiment and another new laptop. In the direct connection baseline experiment we let the fast and slow laptops communicate peerto-peer at the same time as the desktop and the new laptop communicate peer-to-peer. We chose this setup since the new laptop is slower than both the slow and the fast laptops and the desktop is the fastest thus keeping the average performance of the two endpoints roughly the same in the two sessions. Now to evaluate concurrent stream overhead in a single gateway we let the new laptop use the fast laptop's gateway (LGAT), and the slow laptop use the desktop's gateway (LGAT). The desktop and the fast laptop both use their own local gateways (LGAT). We note that this leads to both streams sharing both LGATs and also the same single CGAT. We now start both sessions, and let them run concurrently for about 7 minutes to extract our benchmark latency values from the desktop peer and its session with the new laptop. Note, that we only use the session between the fast and slow laptop as overhead and do not measure it directly. After the 7 minutes have passed we stop the session between the old and new laptops and observe how the performance instantly picks up for the other session that we keep alive. The results keen be seen in Figure 11 .
We note that there is a 20ms drop in RTT when the concurrent stream stops. Given that the absolute performance of a single stream is also about 20ms we can extrapolate the potential number of streams our gateway can handle given a RTT requirement. As a rule of thumb at about 200ms RTT the session starts feeling like it is lagging. This means slow  wired  47  55  15  11  55  5  fast  wired  36  32  3  8  32  1  fast  wireless  48  94  25  12  94  7 (a) RTT (b) Jitter Figure 11 : Latency in the concurrent and single stream setups compared to direct link sessions involving three laptops and a desktop on the same wired network.
that our gateway could handle up to 10 concurrent sessions assuming no other contentions occur. Given that it is easy to load balance both between LGAT and CGAT services we believe this to be a reasonable overhead. Note also that an
LGAT/CGAT can be shared among a much high number of users, since all users would not use the gateway at the same time.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a solution for tunneling WebRTC data plane traffic efficiently with minimal setup through restricted networks having strict firewall policies.
Our solution relies on intercepting key parts of the WebRTC JSEP session establishment protocol and using local network gateways that can multiplex traffic from multiple concurrent streams efficiently without "leaking" any WebRTC traffic across the firewall except through a trusted port such as port 80.
The advantage of our solution compared to existing work is that the traffic is relayed and all the dynamic port allocation is done on the local network, while still allowing the traffic to be re-routed to arbitrary networks. It would even be trivial to load balance our traffic on the fly by simply relaying the packets through a different central gateway. None of the communicating browsers would have to know. Given the use of SRTP encryption of the payloads there is no risk of eavesdropping middlemen.
We have shown that the latency impact of our gateway is acceptable to the user experience up to about 10 concurrent streams going through the same gateway (given a perstream RTT overhead of about 20ms). The WebRTC runtime in the browser is quite CPU intensive in general, so the browser that runs the end-user application needs to be powerful enough to be able to avoid additional latency. Our gateway can be run on a local device collocated with the browser to minimize network traffic, but the CPU impact of this setup is significant. So it needs to be a powerful machine to avoid latency. This performance impact and the additional configuration effort is the reason why we recommend deploying dedicated machines on the local network to run our gateways. They may easily be replicated and loadbalanced. Providing automated gateway selection, local and central, could improve the scalability significantly, but was out of scope for the work presented here.
Our experiments also showed that the additional session establishment overhead is acceptable, in the order of 1-5 seconds. Here, there is a small advantage to having a local host gateway.
Future work includes testing our gateway with more browsers as the WebRTC PeerConnection API is being supported by more vendors, and investigating the feasibility of hiding our implementation behind the TURN protocol to avoid custom Javascript code to redirect the traffic during the JSEP handshake. Embedding an additional Javascript library does not have much impact on the application, though, since applications would need to embed a custom WebRTC library in any case as the signalling plane implementation is application specific.
We are also continuing work on deploying this solution in our home-care project at hospitals and with patients.
